employee pension funds. In doing so, KKR has been an indirect beneficiary of public policies intended to reduce the uncertainties of retirement.
In conjunction with these public policy opportunities, KKR developed an investor-controlled governance structure, the leveraged buyout (LBO) association, that reduces two types of organizational inefficiencies: collective action problems, which have inhibited institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, from acting as a unified control group, and agency costs, which have plagued the large firm since the separation of ownership from control occurred in the early part of the twentieth century. In both cases, KKR has reduced costs by aligning managerial and property interests through common ownership.8
If institutional investors are to pool their resources for acquiring an undervalued firm, the investors must agree on possible takeover targets, on the premiums they are willing to pay, on the terms of the buyout, and on the composition of the board that will oversee the firm's reorganization. KKR has overcome these coordination problems through its limited partnerships. Once an investor enters the partnership, it charges KKR with the responsibility for targeting companies, negotiating terms, and overseeing the reorganized firm's performance. KKR minimizes these costs by aligning its interests with those of investors by taking an equity position in each acquisition. KKR applies the same principle when employing managers, all of whom have large equity stakes in the firms they operate.
When these organizational innovations were combined with the financial innovations of the 1980s, KKR and other leveraged buyout investment companies seriously challenged the managerially controlled firm and forced a realignment of managerial and shareholder risk preferences, particularly among conglomerate firms with strong cash flows in stable industries. This realignment worked itself out in capital restructurings that exchanged retained earnings for debt and thereby increased financial risk.
Within this process, KKR played an important, if not the leading, role. Although all the firms participating in the corporate buying binge of the 1980s enjoyed these public policy advantages, KKR emerged as the takeover giant of the decade. At its peak, KKRowned companies-including RJR Nabisco, Safeway, Owens-Illinois, and Duracell-had annual sales greater than those of Chrysler, Texaco, or AT&T and employed nearly 400,000 people. Despite this corporate presence, KKR itself consisted of only twenty partners and associates and another thirty secretaries, receptionists, and assistants in New York and San Francisco offices. 9 We divide our story about the interconnections between KKR and public policy into five sections: an introduction to agency theory and its challenge to managerial capitalism, with a focus on postSecond World War antitrust enforcement; a review of other postwar public policies that have consistently defended the prerogatives of managerial capitalism and that created an environment in the 1980s conducive to KKR's strategy; the story of KKR as seen in the history of deconglomeration, leveraged buyouts, and megadeals in the 1970s and 1980s (although we do not present detailed accounts of individual takeovers, which have been widely described in contemporary popular accounts); a review of KKR's strategy after the end of the LBO boom and of the tax laws that encouraged it, as the company has shifted from conglomerate deconstruction to industrial reconstruction-a shift that has forced KKR to think of itself less as an industrial auctioneer and more as an industrial entrepreneur; and our conclusions about the possibilities of a new type of industrial organization and the attention to public needs in the next stage of American capitalism.
Agency Theorists and the Market for Corporate Control
Financial agency theory grew out of post-Second World War developments in corporate finance that used economic models scientifically to judge optimal capital structures. These models allowed scholars to think about the probable effects of government policies, such as taxation, on managerial decisions and to devise financial instruments for optimal shareholder investment.10 Building on this work, agency theorists asked questions about how corporate financial policy affected corporate organization. These questions led to the construction of a microeconomic model in which the firm appeared as a set of financially negotiated contractual relationships, giving economic substance to the firm's formal governance structure.1l At the center of this model was the manager, who was responsible for arranging, among the corporation's various stakeholders, contracts that made the firm a value-maximizing organization. Agency theorists also noted, as had many before them, that the separation of ownership from control had eroded the assumption that the managers who oversaw this process would find it in their interest to write value-maximizing contracts. Although agency theorists acknowledged that the managerially controlled firm offered benefits-the efficiencies from a division of labor between decision makers (managers) and risk takers (shareholders) and from shareholder liquidity and portfolio diversification-they also believed that the costs of the managerially run firm were far greater than others had calculated.12 In drawing on the managerial economic literature that had preceded them, agency theorists made bold claims that America's economic decline could in large measure be attributed to managerial opportunism-that is, to managers' suboptimal use of corporations' excess cash flows.
Agency theorists reasoned that shareholders and managers have different stakes in the firm. Shareholders, although risk-averse, are able to reduce risk through a diversified portfolio of investments; consequently, they expect managers to seek unique market opportunities (risks) that will bring above-average rates of return. Managers, although also risk-averse, are tied to their jobs by constricted managerial labor markets and nonportable firm-specific investments, including perquisites and expertise. Unlike the shareholders, manag- ers cannot readily diversify their risks outside the firm, so they seek to reduce the firm's market risks. They achieve this end by retaining earnings rather than paying out excess corporate cash to shareholders.13 This policy allows managers to build up cash reserves for subduing unanticipated commercial difficulties and for making corporate acquisitions. Acquisitions build empires that allow the firm to be broadly diversified, putting the firm and its management at less risk; industrial empires require managerial hierarchies, which expand managers' career opportunities.
Hence, the managerially controlled firm brings with it monitoring or agency costs to ensure that managers do not pursue goals that are, from the shareholders' perspective, suboptimal. Monitoring takes place through the firm's internal governance structure (for example, its hierarchical reporting and its managerial incentive systems, its rule by board directorship, and its proxy mechanism), through shareholder-derivative law suits, and through the market for corporate control. Yet, for agency theorists, neither corporate governance nor the law offers adequate protection against managerial opportunism. Managers dominate the governance process, and dispersed ownership presents collective action problems that make concerted shareholder activity almost impossible. The courts are ineffectual because they generally defer to management under the business judgment rule.
Instead, therefore, agency theorists gave great credence to the market for corporate control. They argued that, when shareholders find managerial decisions contrary to the firm's profit-maximizing end, they sell their shares, driving down the firm's market price. Theoretically, when the price falls below replacement costs, alternative management teams (whether part of another corporation, independent corporate raiders, or even a group of internal managers) have an economic incentive to bid for control, either to revitalize the firm or to auction off its parts for a premium. As Henry Manne, agency theory's progenitor, argued in a seminal essay in 1965, an 13 Michael Jensen defines the conflict of free cash flow in the following way: "Free cash flow is cash in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital ... Payment of cash to shareholders reduces the resources under managers' power and potentially subjects them to monitoring by the capital markets." Michael C. Jensen, "The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence," in Coffee, Lowenstein, and Rose-Ackerman, eds., Knights, Raiders and Targets, 321. For a technical discussion of this topic and how to evaluate net present value projects, see Alfred Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value: The New Standardfor Business Performance (New York, 1986). unregulated merger market is self-correcting.14 Manne held that economic efficiency could not be judged ex ante as antitrust doctrines claimed, but could be judged only ex post, after a deal's consummation and its subsequent performance. If a firm's managers designed unwholesome deals to advance their interests, they would become targets for takeovers by managers of other firms aligned to the financial market's maximizing imperative. Manne argued that managers-despite their penchant for opportunism-were better suited than federal regulators to evaluate merger activity, and for this reason he opposed stringent antitrust enforcement.
However, as agency theorists told the story of American corporate history in the 1950s and 1960s, Manne's prescriptions went unheeded, and a series of public policies evolved that interfered with the financial market's ability to keep managerial deal-making in line.15 Antitrust laws, tender-offer regulation, state anti-takeover laws, and a host of securities regulations had undermined-in the minds of agency theorists-the disciplinary function of the market. For agency theorists, these public policies allowed management to misuse corporations' excess cash flows (retained earnings) during the 1960s and 1970s, and this misappropriation had put America on the road toward economic decline.16
In particular, Manne led the agency theorists' argument that antitrust law, as it had developed and been enforced since the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950, had promoted market inefficiencies because it restricted the threat that mergers posed for managers. Cellar-Kefauver closed a loophole in the Clayton Act (1914) that had allowed firms to engage in horizontal mergers as long as the buyer purchased a target's assets rather than its shares. For agency theorists, then, political preferences restrained financial institutions from reintegrating ownership and control and from reducing the agency costs that allegedly had contributed so much to America's economic decline. But it was managerial passivity, not regulatory safeguards, that agency theorists denounced when considering why pension funds had failed to reintegrate ownership and control. These funds, which grew enormously during 1960-90, invested heavily in equity; by the 1980s pension funds owned controlling equity in nearly 40 percent of the country's largest firms. In fact, the top twenty pension funds owned controlling equity in 15 percent of the nation's top one hundred corporations.31 Subtle factors, according to agency theorists, inhibited pension funds from asserting the control to which they were entitled.
Although they were not restricted from taking an active position, company pension funds were restricted by law from holding more than 5 percent of any one firm's stock. Because these funds were dispersed over innumerable private companies and government agencies, their power depended on fund management coordination, which created numerous collective action problems that were apparently too costly to solve.32 In addition, agency theorists noted constraints created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which oversees the workings of most private pension funds. ERISA, for prudential reasons, demands that funds be diversified; moreover, ERISA has a particularly conservative interpreta- mous wealth from such deals with members of the investment community who could aid in KKR's quest for profits. A total of $248 million was distributed to bankers, lawyers, and others who participated in the Beatrice takeover.35 KKR was originally a partnership of three individuals: Jerome Kohlberg and two cousins, Henry Kravis and George Roberts, all of whom had worked together at the investment firm Bear Steams during the early 1970s. Kohlberg, the senior of the three, had recognized early on, during his investment banking activities at Bear Steams, that a specialized market existed for "bootstrap deals" or, as they were later called, leveraged buyouts.
There were two types of sellers in this market: entrepreneurs who owned family businesses and corporate managers of large conglomerates. In the mid-1960s, Kohlberg noticed that the generation of entrepreneurs who had built successful family businesses during the postwar economic boom were about to retire. These commercial elders wanted to pass their firms on to the next generation in a way that would avoid estate taxes and retain family control. At that time, only two choices existed: to go public or to sell out to a larger company. In both cases, the family lost control. Kohlberg came up with a third option: the leveraged buyout. In this scenario, the firm sold off most of its equity to a group of investors who purchased the firm with borrowed funds. The family still held equity, and the investor group allowed the family to run the business. But, because the firm was highly leveraged, the controlling group was under pressure to improve the firm's efficiency to pay off its substantial debt. If the controlling interest was successful in improving the firm's cashgenerating capacity and in paying off the debt, the investor group could easily sell its shares for a substantial profit.36 This would leave the family holding a controlling interest in a firm more valuable than it had been in its previous form.37 37 Bryan Burrough and John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (New York, 1990), 133-34. In 1965 Kohlberg put together his first deal, which involved a $9.5 million acquisition of Stem Metals, a dental manufacturer. In this case, Kohlberg found a group of investors who, using other people's money, bought the firm from the seventy-two-year-old founder. The new owners left the family with a substantial equity holding and let them run the business. The family was so successful that when the investors sold their $500,000 investment to the public four years later, they garnered $4 mil-Kohlberg also found a second group of promising clients for his leveraged buyout services-managers of conglomerates. By the early 1970s the stock market had become disenchanted with conglomerates, and managers of these once-vibrant corporate entities were now looking for ways to sell off underperforming divisions. Ironically, many of these divisions had been economically viable before their acquisition but had faltered once placed under the conglomerate shell. Operational managers still believed that their divisions could return to profitability, if they could break away from their dysfunctional parents. Starting in 1970, the number of conglomerate divestitures increased dramatically, accounting for 53 percent of all transactions by 1977.38 Kohlberg was aware of this trend, and he believed that many of these firms could be made into profitable private, stand-alone undertakings. Kohlberg established several guiding principles for success in these ventures. First, he worked on leveraged buyouts only with the cooperation of inside management, who had the privileged knowledge necessary for determining the firm's potential value and for executing business plans to realize that value. Second, Kohlberg targeted stable industrial firms that generated the strong cash flows required for servicing the heavy debt payments that a leveraged buyout incurred. Third, to ensure management's cooperation (that is, to reduce agency costs) in each phase of the buyout, Kohlberg distributed lucrative stock incentives to top management, making them owners of the firms that they once only superintended.39
As Kohlberg crafted his skills in analyzing potential buyouts and in arranging investor funds, he educated his younger Bear Stearns colleagues, Kravis and Roberts, in this seemingly unimportant portion of the investment banking industry. Kohlberg mentored these two cousins despite social and political differences. Although Kohlberg came from a modest background, he had been trained at elite institutions (undergraduate degree from Swarthmore, MBA from Harvard, and a law degree from Columbia), and he was a staunch supporter of the New Deal; in contrast, his younger colleagues came from Republican families in the Southwest with deep ties to the oil industry and strong antipathies toward New Deal legacies. Still, the three functioned as a working team and carved out a niche in Bear Steams that they believed was substantial enough to merit organization as a separate business unit. When senior management turned down this initiative, the three left to form their own partnership in 1976. These three investment bankers agreed from the start that KKR would be a specialized, or "boutique," firm in investment banking. In general, investment banking mediates the asset flows between investors (companies, institutions, and individuals) and issuers, who sell bonds, shares, or parts of a firm. Investment banks compete in the various products they offer and in the customers they are able to serve. Top-tier firms such as Goldman Sachs, First Boston, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch hold on to their competitive position by offering diversified investment banking products and services (for example, investment-grade bonds, privately placed securities, international convertibles, and merger and acquisition advice) to large firms and by developing a retail capability that complements their wholesale activities. Traditionally, these top-tier firms had generated income from fees and had rarely placed their own capital at risk by engaging in the so-called merchant banking activities of bridge loans and equity investments.40
In contrast, KKR focused on a market niche, mergers and acquisitions, and within that area specialized in leveraged buyouts, an activity ignored by the larger firms. Moreover, KKR operated as a merchant bank, putting its own capital at risk by taking equity positions in the deals it arranged. This decision grew out of the partners' positive experiences with integrating ownership and control. They found that putting their own capital at risk gave investors good reason to trust the firm as a financial advisor and as a fiduciary (agent) managing the investors' funds. In effect, KKR was telling investors that it would have little reason to act opportunistically, thus minimizing investors' monitoring costs.
KKR's approach was particularly appealing to large institutional investors, for it offered a partial resolution to an increasingly perplexing problem: how to discipline management. Traditionally, institutional investors used the Wall Street method, simply exiting from an underperforming firm.41 However, as institutional investments became increasingly concentrated during the 1970s and 1980s, it became more difficult to sell off shares without taking extraordinary losses. To alleviate this situation, institutional investors sought a greater voice on the boards of directors of firms in which they held substantial positions; public pension funds even formed an association, the Council of Institutional Investors, to promote this effort.42 Yet, for reasons cited earlier, the opportunity for institutional representation has remained latent, making KKR's approach to agency problems all the more attractive. And because KKR depended so heavily on its relationship with asset purchasers rather than with asset sellers, the firm developed close ties to its investors, much as traditional investment banks had cultivated relations with their principal customers (issuers). The strategy would slowly pay off, as KKR was able to raise enormous amounts of equity capital from institutional investors, particularly public pension funds.
To leverage its investment funds to buy out companies, KKR relied on large commercial banks for senior bank debt, secured by the firm's assets. Insurance companies supplemented these funds by supplying subordinated debt. Until the mid-1980s, insurance companies were able to impose strict conditions on subordinated debt because of the lack of alternative sources. In the mid-1980s, however, insurance companies became less important, as the market in high-yield or "junk" bonds developed. prises, which do not divert cash from one enterprise to another as is typical in multidivisional undertakings. Nonetheless, these partnerships are tied together through KKR's equity participation in each of its sponsored partnerships. The partnerships' interdependence is reinforced by KKR's fiduciary obligations to represent its investors on the board of directors of each KKR-controlled firm (where KKR partners control the compensation and audit committees) and by the participation of many of KKR's investors in multiple partnerships.45
With its interlocking governance structure, KKR serves as an informational clearinghouse, making it difficult for a company to misrepresent itself and allowing for early intervention when a firm is experiencing financial distress.46 Accurate information, along with property connections, promotes trust and allows implicit contracts among KKR partners that are more flexible and less costly than the contract writing that typifies market relationships.47 Yet, because each firm is a stand-alone unit, it need not enter into a business relationship with any other KKR-controlled business. Market prices, not administrative command, link supplier-buyer connections within the KKR investor association, providing member companies with a mechanism for evaluating the benefits and costs of their internal had unintentionally provided KKR with an entrepreneurial opportunity. Government policies encouraged pension fund formation to supplement Social Security benefits for retired employees. State governments moved early on to encourage public pension funds by establishing favorable tax treatment (for example, deferring tax payments on employee contributions until benefits are paid) and by setting strict fiduciary standards to superintend pension fund managers.54 In 1976, after about a decade of debate, Congress also enacted national pension fund legislation. Although the Employee Retirement Income Security Act left the administration of nonfederal public pension funds to the states, it brought private pension funds under federal jurisdiction. Like its state counterparts, ERISA used the tax system to encourage private pension fund formation (for example, by allowing sponsors to deduct contributions from income) and protected beneficiaries by setting fiduciary standards for the funds' administration.55
For state and federal legislators, the surge in pension fund assets testified to their statesmanship in using public incentives to create an extensive private employee retirement system. But for KKR, this system appeared as an opportune source of funds for leveraged buyouts. Of the two types of funds, KKR believed that public funds would be the more promising client. Although private pension funds had more assets than their public counterparts, public pension funds were growing more quickly in the 1980s and were among the largest funds in the nation.56 Growth and size worked together to prompt public fund managers to find investment opportunities that were large enough to absorb the incoming cash flows and that promised yields high enough to meet future obligations.57 But pension fund managers found themselves constrained by state laws that prohibited various types of investments, particularly equity investments. Legislators had imposed these restrictions to protect themselves from charges that public funds were being imprudently placed in volatile markets.58 These limits gave rise to an unanticipated complaint: that the pension funds were earning below-market rates of return, leaving them with insufficient funds to meet their obligations. This situation forced state legislators to review pension fund investment policies, and in many cases the legislators permitted pension fund managers to invest in equity.59 Oregon was among the first states to revise its pension fund guidelines. In the mid-1960s Robert Strauss, the state's treasurer, had successfully lobbied for legislation that permitted the state's pension funds to invest in equities. To ensure that the funds' trustees acted prudently, the law mandated that the Oregon Investment Council hire independent firms to manage these equity investments.
By the 1980s, the council, led by Roger Meier, prided itself on its ability to assess investment funds. Indeed, the council was so moneywise that members did not balk when KKR approached them to naled its ability to attempt a takeover of any large firm.67 With the aid of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the equity capital could be leveraged by a factor of ten, leaving no firm too large for a KKR takeover.
In bidding for Beatrice, KKR had forsaken its founding principle that leveraged buyouts were to be cooperative ventures between management teams and investors. This apostasy-as Kohlberg viewed it-broke the partnership. Between 1983 and 1985 Kohlberg was seriously ill and left the management of the firm to his partners. Under their stewardship KKR aggressively pursued larger and larger deals, seeking the extraordinary profits that they would yield, particularly through the investment fee structures. Kohlberg was decidedly unhappy with this new direction, and he opposed entering into a hostile bid for Beatrice. Unable to convince his partners (and with a growing number of other differences over how the firm should do its business), Kohlberg left the company in 1987 to start a new firm more consistent with KKR's original frugality.68
Market forces-the availability of financial sources to fund large leveraged buyouts and the advent of a new merger wave-had forced KKR's partners to decide whether their earlier interdiction against corporate raiding continued to make good business sense. These forces of change were neither impersonal nor unknown to KKR; they had grown inexorably out of KKR's successes in carrying out its initial business strategy. Freed from their prudential consciousness, KKR moved firmly but cautiously along its new course. Caution was called for because KKR's principal funding sources, the public pension funds, were either prohibited from or wary of hostile takeovers. Consequently, KKR advanced tactically by taking toe-hold positions in corporate firms to force negotiations between themselves and management.69
Kravis and Roberts's pursuit of megadeals was more in keeping with the market than was Kohlberg's opposition. The conglomerate merger movement peaked in 1969, and merger activity sloped down- The fourth merger wave had another distinguishing feature that helped account for the number of megadeals done during the decade-the hostile takeover. Although the absolute number of hostile tender offers was small during the period, the percentage of their value relative to the total value of mergers was large. For example, in 1985 there were only thirty-five contested tender offers out of approximately three thousand merger and acquisition announcements, but these contested takeovers accounted for approximately 22 percent of the total value of reported transactions that year.75
These unfriendly megabids were the direct descendants of Kohlberg's amicable leveraged buyouts, particularly those involving conglomerate spinoffs. Along with KKR, firms such as Forstmann Little, & Co. and individuals like Carl Icahn, Saul Steinberg, and Sir James Goldsmith had perfected techniques for evaluating undervalued firms and had developed the financial networks to arrange leveraged buyouts.76 As their skills and resources grew, particularly with the aid of Drexel, they became involved in larger and larger deals, including hostile ones. Eventually, their success caught the attention of the top tier of investment banking firms.
For two decades, the major investment banks had been develop- Table 2 ).84
The battle for RJR once again warned corporate managers of the perils posed by the market for corporate control, first brought home to them in 1984 when T. Boone Pickens made his tender offer for Gulf Oil. Management's response to this challenge was swift and effective. First, corporate managers acted defensively by taking economic steps to make their firms less attractive to hostile bidders.
Many corporations adopted a value-based planning process for strategically assessing the contributions of each of the firm's business units. This procedure concentrated on the cash flows that a business unit generated rather than on accounting figures to determine its contributions. From this vantage point, the corporation will prize those units that can generate positive net cash flow, using the corporation's cost of capital as the discount rate.85 Units unable to make this hurdle were sold off by the corporation to buyers who felt they could make them profitable. In effect, corporate managers acted as internal raiders 89 "The Ebb Tide," The Economist, 17. Interestingly, cyclical and stable industries both climbed sharply at the end of the 1970s; however, whereas the cyclical industry debt-service ratio declined precipitously in 1982, the stable industry ratio continued upward.
90 Anti-takeover defenses have become an industry in itself, scrutable only to the initiated. But general descriptions of these various gambits do exist. A poison pill refers to securities issued by a target firm that give the shareholders the right to purchase the stock of an acquiring firm at a discount. Supermajority provisions require a majority greater than 50 percent to approve mergers; fair-price provisions modify the corporate charter to require the buyer to pay minority shareholders a fair market price for their shares; and dual capitalization restructures the corporation's equity into two classes with different voting rights. For a general discussion on these various anti-takeover tactics see Gaughan, Mergers and Acquisitions, 154-219, and Richard Ruback, "An Overview of Takeover Defenses," in Auerbach, ed., Mergers, 49-67. 96 President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality, Jan. 1985. By so focusing its inquiries, the Democratic-controlled Congress was in fact examining whether corporate takeovers were proving themselves to be an effective alternative to the national development bank that Ronald Reagan's administration and others had promoted as a tool to make American manufacturing internationally competitive. Agency theorists and investment bankers testified that the burgeoning market for corporate control was an efficient alternative to a public reconstruction finance corporation.
In helping to provoke a corporate restructuring, in bringing new capital into a "bankrupt" industry, and in forging a new organizational form, KKR has certainly functioned as a "private reconstruction finance corporation," as opponents of a national development bank claim. Yet, neither KKR nor the fourth merger wave of which it was a part has fulfilled all that was anticipated by proponents of a national development bank. The role envisioned for this public bank was to help finance investments in basic and specialized infrastructures, in job retraining, in local educational systems, in the upgrading of regional technical schools, and in the development of regional research, development, and commercialization projects that would involve public and private participants. By providing these public goods, the national development bank was to assist American industry to compete internationally and to ensure that the costs of restructuring would be equitably handled. Certainly, the United States made little headway in these areas in the 1980s and faltered in most; for many, a national development bank still has much of the appeal that it had in the early 1980s. LBOs engendered, not hindered, labor output, employment, and investment in research and development.
The most vocal opponents of this sanguine appraisal came from the ranks of corporate managers. In contrast to financial agency theorists and investment bankers, managers declared that contests over control detracted from America's competitiveness. For these managers, the market for corporate control was nothing more than an extortion racket, run by a handful of investment bankers and arbitrage firms. The Business Roundtable, one of the nation's major business associations, argued that when an investment bank took a position in a corporation, the purchase put the firm into "play," as arbitrage firms raced to buy stock in the allegedly targeted firm. Once a firm was in play, the financial institutions hoped to profit in one of two unproductive ways: either they could cash out before the market caught on to the "game," or the investment house could threaten to make a takeover bid in the hope that management would be willing to buy back its holdings for a premium (greenmail) and to find a white knight to pay off the hostile bidder. All of this activity, the Business Roundtable insisted, diverted management's attention from long-term strategic matters to short-term financial considerations and undid the loyalties that had once existed among the firms' various stakeholders.98
In laying out these arguments, corporate managers found themselves allied with those individuals and interest groups (most notably the AFL-CIO) who had favored public policies that sought restrictions on market takeover activities in the 1980s. Perhaps nothing better illustrates this coalitional realignment than Felix Rohatyn's testimony on corporate takeovers and LBOs.99 Although himself a senior partner of an investment bank on the Business Roundtable's list of financial predators, Rohatyn spoke sharply against the current merger wave. He acknowledged that agency theorists were technically correct: a market for corporate control could minimize monitoring costs. But he contended that this market had become nothing more than a speculative game, redistributing wealth rather than creating it. He blamed lax antitrust laws, deregulation, and a general free market ideology for having severed the fiduciary relationship between investment bankers and their corporate clients. In this brave new world, investment bankers had only transactional relationships with their clients and were primarily interested in trading for short-term gains. As a result, investment bankers no longer looked at the firm as an ongoing enterprise that required nurturing; instead, they viewed it, incorrectly, as a set of security offerings whose values could be manipulated for personal gain. Unless regulatory measures were taken to curb this speculation, Rohatyn warned, the capital markets would wreck-rather than resurrect-America's industrial base.l00
When these discussions moved from aggregate statistics to specific details, KKR's name was frequently mentioned. Accordingly, KKR had to take political measures to protect its reputation and to stall reforms contrary to its interests. Over the years, the firm had developed a quiet, relational approach to public affairs management, particularly with its principal state pension fund investors. Even in these new circumstances, where the nation's main legislative body was focusing attention on KKR, the company preserved its low profile strategy. Rather than testifying before Congress, the KKR partners spoke individually with members of Congress and commissioned a report for the public record by the accounting firm When the collapse of the junk-bond market brought a sudden halt to LBO activity in 1989, Congress discontinued its assessment of whether the market for corporate control was the meritorious alternative to a national development bank that free market advocates had predicted. Indeed, it is still much too soon to judge the longterm effects of the LBO era.107 The recent excellent work of Naomi Lamoreaux and Tom McCraw has yielded a more complete understanding of the first merger movement in the United States and demonstrates the need for historical distance when evaluating contemporary events. We too are shocked by the phenomenal fortunes that many in the financial community accumulated-some legally and some illegally-during the period of unbridled competition in the 1980s, and we are convinced that Wall Street's contempt for everything but financial success contributed to bank managers' moral abandonment and the unhappy consequences that followed. Critics of LBOs and the takeovers of the 1980s have also focused on the impact of those deals on the long-term productive capabilities of U.S. industry. Yet, our purpose in this essay has not been to argue that the LBO movement of the 1980s was a positive or a negative era for the U.S. economy. Rather, we wished to make three points. First, the movement was made possible by a series of public policies over the three previous decades that created an environment in which such activity might flourish. Second, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. most successfully took advantage of this environment-particularly of the federal government's ideological refusal to develop a coherent program to revitalize U.S. industry, instead leaving it to the private capital markets to fund new investment.108 The recent activity in the market for corporate control has realigned managerial and shareholder risks, particularly among conglomerate firms and in industries protected from international product-market competition. Recent events demonstrate that these effects have reached even into dynamic companies that must compete globally, compelling managers to take on competitive risks and to "disgorge excess cash flows" into uses at least more productive than managerial perks. the 1980s is the pressure being brought to bear by coalitions of institutional investors in the 1990s; another is internal revolt such as that occurring at General Motors in 1992-93.11o KKR's success during the 1980s both led to the restructuring of American capitalism through leveraged buyouts and, perhaps more important, signaled a dissatisfaction with traditional managerial capitalism that has led to an assault on management from many quarters-from institutional investors, employees, and inside the boardroom itself.
Third, the LBO association poses an organizational challenge to traditional managerial capitalism. Within the context of the LBO era of the 1980s, KKR played an important if not a leading role. Its successes in taking over large public corporations-first Houdaille, then Beatrice, and finally RJR-prompted many firms to institute defensive corporate restructuring plans. Most observers agree that, in putting together these deals, KKR displayed unusual financial skills, but many see these deals narrowly, as instruments for making short-term gains. We, on the other hand, have suggested that these financial arrangements are much like constitutional rules that set the rights and responsibilities of an ongoing enterprise, in this case of an investor association, which we see as KKR's entrepreneurial innovation.
KKR's investor association represents an organizational solution to the agency problems that have long plagued the managerially controlled firm. The resolution of this economically harmful conflict grows out of KKR's ability to overcome the collective action problems that have prevented institutional owners from cooperating as active investors and its ability to minimize the agency costs that these investors incur in employing KKR as their coordinating agent. The key to KKR's solution is property. As an equity holder in its investment funds, KKR minimizes the agency costs that its investors face; and by granting managers substantial equity holdings in the firm that they run (not only in company headquarters, but also, in some instances, at the local level), KKR reduces its monitoring costs. Because the KKR association is investor-controlled, the market for corporate control can be used to assess whether the firm adds greater value to the association as a member or as a nonmember.
As the market for corporate control slowed and the political 10 John Pound argues that this investor "political" activity will replace takeover activities as the fundamental threat to traditional corporate governance. "Beyond Takeovers pressure for reform abated, KKR recast its business strategy for an era of financial retrenchment.1l By creating ongoing concerns that are investor-controlled, KKR has devised an organizational alternative to the managerially controlled firm-at least for firms in stable, mature industries. In theory, these investor-controlled firms obtain economic advantages because of their reduced agency costs. This threat of an alternative organizational form spurred an upheaval in corporate financial structure during the 1980s, particularly among firms in noncyclical industries.1l2
Yet, KKR's evolving strategy may also have implications for firms in dynamic industries that compete internationally. During the 1980s, KKR had primarily functioned as a "private reconstruction bank," putting right the policy outcomes that had promoted the conglomerate wave of the 1960s and realigning managerial and shareholder risk preferences. In the current setting, it has returned to a reconstruction bank's traditional role: the reorganization of distressed industries. KKR has decided to assist mainly those industries that complement its existing business strengths; by focusing its efforts, KKR is committed to making its LBO association a cooperative enterprise that can compete in global businesses over the long term. If successful, KKR will be among the first to refashion the moder American business firm into an investor-controlled under-
taking.
This dedication to industrial development is not something new to KKR. Certainly, during the 1980s, KKR acted in many instances simply as a financial auctioneer, buying and selling firms for shortterm gains. Yet, of the thirteen buyouts KKR arranged in 1986-92, ten are still KKR-owned. Moreover, KKR has signaled its intention to create among its holdings a group of interrelated firms, which may do business with one another and may jointly seek new business opportunities. KKR has fashioned many of these companies into at least three distinctive industry blocs inside the association, one in lumber and wood products, another in industrial machinery and equipment, and a third in commercial printing and publishing (see Fig. 1 any other member, even though these firms are related by ownership. Here, then, is another way in which KKR's investor association differs from the managerially controlled firm, which administers relations among its units. KKR's organizational form lets these relationships develop among the association's member firms as market opportunities arise. Thus, in addition to reducing agency costs, KKR's innovative investor-controlled "conglomerate" adds economic value through its ability to use the market for solving the complex cost accounting problems that have continuously plagued the vertically integrated firm.14 And, because KKR's firms are interconnected through a common governance structure, informational flows allow for less expensive contracting relationships (implicit contracting) than normal market transactions. KKR's other principal target for growth in the 1990s, the commercial banking industry, conforms to these strategic premises. KKR once again took advantage of market opportunities created by public policies-in particular, policies that pushed commercial banks into insolvency and established a regulatory agency that offered incentives to attract salvage firms into the industry. In 1990, KKR took a toe-hold position in First Interstate Bancorporation of California by purchasing 9.8 percent of the outstanding shares for $111.5 million. In 1991, KKR purchased $283 million of the nonvoting stock in Fleet Norstar Financial Group, enabling Fleet to purchase the insolvent Bank of New England. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. banking industry will be going through various merger and acquisition phases as it adjusts to regulatory reforms and increasing global competition, so banking is clearly an industry where KKR's basic competencies can be put to profitable use. By entering the commercial banking sector, KKR will gain capital resources that can be used to finance future acquisitions and internal projects. KKR will also gain economies of scope, both externally for assessing other potential acquisitions and internally for monitoring its holdings. Within the association, a commercial bank's credit and monitoring functions surely would augment the property and business linkages that bond KKR's industrial blocs. Finally, entry into this industry will obviously advance KKR's goal of being engaged in global markets. Should financial deregulation advance in the 1990s, KKR would find additional avenues for savings in the economies of scope that would accompany a financial holding company and in the deepening busi-ness and informational connections that a commercial bank would facilitate inside the association.
It is not hard to imagine that similar business connections would emerge between any KKR commercial bank and the firms within the KKR network. Currently, banking regulations allow KKR to act only as a passive investor.115 But, as we read the available documents, KKR has plans to be an active investor-that is, to win and control commercial banks.116 Ownership would provide additional sources of capital for engaging in what has been KKR's primary business, leveraged buyouts, and would provide economies of scope in dealing with the financial markets in arranging non-LBO acquisitions. A bank would also be able to provide commercial services to KKR's other holdings, forming integral business ties among them and potentially structuring KKR's empire into an industrial group. If KKR is successful in carrying out this strategic goal, it will create a complex set of investor-controlled firms that find their closest analog in the Japanese keiretsu.117 This strategy depends on a reformation of the New Deal regula-115 When KKR invests in solvent institutions, the expectations arise from projections about future performance; however, when KKR passively invests in failed institutions, these returns are in large measure dependent on the generosity of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which has responsibility for restructuring and recapitalizing the impoverished banking system. 116 Like most contemporary analysts, we do not have access to KKR's files. As a result, our history depends on public documents, which we tie together into a narrative by concepts taken from theoretical business disciplines. In particular, we make use of ideas in corporate strategy, agency theory, and transaction cost economics to explicate KKR's intentions and to account for its value-enhancing capabilities. tory tradition that has separated the commercial and investment banking functions and prohibited commercial banks and manufacturing firms from holding stakes in one another. KKR therefore may be required to act entrepreneurially in the political arena if it is to achieve its long-range goals. However, we do not believe that KKR's enduring entrepreneurial contribution lies in urging banking reform; market forces have long made banking deregulation a public policy imperative, even as they have created complex political alliances that have forestalled a massive regulatory overhaul.118 KKR's potential contribution lies rather in its demonstration, through its economic stewardship of a group of investor-controlled financial and nonfinancial firms, of the possible economic benefits of such reform.
Whether the rival organizational structure will supplant the managerially controlled firm is a matter for some speculation. KKR's current acquisition strategy will indicate whether such an organization is appropriate for competing in dynamic global markets. If it is successful, we may expect to see an extension of this organizational form, with other banks, such as J. P. Morgan, assembling firms around themselves and their investors. The managerial firm is also reforming itself-for example, by facilitating more employee ownership and by permitting internal market relationships to develop among its operating units.119 Thus, the future is likely to offer a number of organizational alternatives to the managerially controlled firm. It is impossible to predict which will become the predominant mode, but it seems certain that the traditional managerial firm-with its lack of investor participation-will come under increasing com- have lost nearly all credibility, as the nation once again re-examines the rules regulating corporate governance to ensure that the firm will remain a viable venture in international competitive markets. What role management will play in this reconsideration has once again become an open question; and concerns about how these new rules will be instituted and conform to American democratic values also remain unresolved.
Managers remain active players in all of these discussions. They are also responding to the new competition by reforming their firms, instituting internal market relationships among operating units, creating closer relationships with their suppliers, and renewing their emphasis on product and process innovation. As part of these reforms, managers have slightly moderated existing governance structures through quality work circles and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) that ask workers to participate in the firm and to link their futures with the firm's long-term performance. Yet, management remains committed, by and large, to its control position. For example, the Business Roundtable, in a 1990 report, "Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness," reneged on a promise delivered in the late 1970s to reform corporate governance to allow for greater accountability to shareholders. After the devastating takeover wars of the 1980s, the Roundtable claimed instead that the large firm's internal hierarchy provided the best means for selecting board members and for reviewing the corporation's performance. Management has shown a similar intransigence in its continuing resistance to union reform, and employee stock ownership plans have swelled over the decade.'20 Whether continuing pressures from the product markets and from the investor community will prod management to engage in open dialogues for reforming the managerial firm remains a story that we will be unable to tell for quite some time.
